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Fault Tree Analysis methodologies applied to 
civil RPAS systems 
Federica Bonfante1 ,Matteo D. L. Dalla Vedova1,*, and Paolo Maggiore1 
1Politecnico di Torino, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Corso Duca degli 
Abruzzi no. 24, 10129, Turin, Italy  
Abstract. This paper is on the Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality 
Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis methodologies applied to the equipment 
and functional subsystems of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). 
Such aerial vehicles have been used almost exclusively for military 
purposes until the first decade of the 2000s. The debate then was focused 
both on technical and regulatory issues and research activities. Thanks to 
this renewed interest on unmanned systems and thanks to relatively recent 
improvements in information science, telecommunication, electronics and 
material science a strong awareness on the potential extension of 
unmanned technologies to civil applications arose up. A variety of 
economic benefits has been recognized by the aviation community from 
the civil use of RPAS, but, due to the absence of the pilot on board both 
military and civilian RPAS have always been relegated to fly into 
segregated airspaces. Technical potentialities of RPAS will be fully 
exploited integrating them into controlled airspaces in a reliable and safe 
way. This paper shows an example of application of FMECA and FTA to 
RPAS and discuss the most critical issues related to the performed analyses 
as well as possible future developments of this work.  
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)  
Since the first decade of 2000s a new interest arose on civil Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems (RPAS). The possibility to fly aircraft without the pilot onboard goes back to the 
years of the Second World War and in 1944 the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) officially acknowledged the existence of unmanned aircraft in the Chicago 
Convention. The technical development of RPAS started in the 1950s and is still on going. 
RPAS were born to be used in military campaigns, but recently, thanks to development and 
combination of lighter and more resistant materials, more refined software and data 
processing applications, and miniaturisation tecniques at lower and lower costs RPAS 
statred to be studied and developed for civilian applications too.  
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RPAS will probably bring economic benefits in terms of competitiveness in many 
economic activities like agriculture, communication industry, monitoring/inspection of 
infrastructures; transport and logistics, energy delivery. RPAS will preserve human beings 
from fatal injuries or death while performing aerial works. In addition, RPAS diffusion will 
create new jobs and professional figures: the remote pilot/operator, the RPAS manufacturer, 
the analyst of engineering data collected by RPAS during operational sorties [1]. For the 
moment, RPAS only, as a subset of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), remotely piloted by 
a human pilot on ground, will be effectively allowed to be integrated into controlled 
airspaces [2].The key to fully realize these scenarios will be the full and safe integration of 
RPAS into controlled airspaces alongside manned aircraft. Therefore, as it happens for 
manned aircraft, reliability of RPAS subsystems and components shall be considered and 
demonstrated. ‘Failure Modes and Effect and Criticality Analysis’ (FMECA) and ‘Fault 
Tree Analysis’ (FTA) are traditional techniques applied in design and development phases 
of manned aircraft. This article shows an example of application of these methodologies to 
RPAS. Physically, RPAS is a ‘system of systems’ composed of [2] the aerial segment (rotor 
wing or fixed wing RPAS or hybrid RPAS), the ground segment (a portable radiocontroller 
or a ground control station), the Communication, Command and Control (C3) radiolink to 
send commands to the aerial segment and to receive telemetry from the aircraft. Rotor wing 
RPAS are powered by electric motors; fixed wing RPAS are powered by combustion 
engines (with propellers or not); hybrid RPAS are driven by electric engines powered by 
hydrogen fuel cells to enhance their range and endurance. This paper is organized as 
follows: Section 1 is an introduction; Section 2 describes FMECA and FTA methodologies; 
Section 3 shows the RPAS architecture used for the analyses; Section 4 shows analyses 
results; finally, Section 5 sums up the conclusions and open points for future works. 
2 The Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) methodologies 
The reliability of a given system is the probability that it performs its mission for the 
intended period of time under given operating conditions. An unmanned system will be 
considered reliable if it is fully operative at the start-up, then during pre-flight test, and 
during the whole assigned mission until engines shut down on ground [3]. The Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are classical 
methodologies widely described in aeronautical literature and systematicaly used in 
manned aviation to study systems reliability. The FMEA was born in the 1940s in defence 
and nuclear sectors and it was formally adopted by NASA in the 1960s when space 
program activities began [3]. It is a design and decisional tool useful to identify all failure 
modes and effects of a system [4]. Each failure mode is ranked according to its severity [4]. 
that is the worst potential consequence (in terms of human beings injury, or third property 
or system damage) that could ultimately occur [4]. The failure mode is the manner in which 
the failure occurs. A failure cause can be a physical, a chemical process, a quality defect, a 
part misapplication or any other process capable of causing a failure or a stating 
deterioration phenomenon that can provoke a failure. A failure mode effect is a possible 
consequence of a given failure mode that can occur at local, next higher or end effect level 
[4]. An extended version of FMEA analysis has been considered in this paper: the FMECA, 
that is the ‘Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis’ [4]. The ‘Criticality  
Analysis’ is a further part of the analysis to rank each potential failure mode according to 
its combination of severity and probability of occurrence [4]. The criticality analysis is 
completed with the evaluation of the most proper assurances and controls applicable for 
limiting the probability of occurrence of the considered failure mode [4].  
The purpose of FMEA or FMECA analysis, is the identification of single point of 
failures that finally are collected in a report draft according to the FMECA template 
foreseen by [4] at task 103. A single point of failure is the failure of an item able to lead in 
the failure of the system and which is not compensated by any redundancy or operational 
procedure [3]. Single point of failures can be mitigated implementing fault tolerance or 
fault avoidance strategies. Fault tolerance strategies are achieved using hardware 
redundancy schemes arranged in duplicated, triplicated or quadruplicated configurations so 
to tolerate the given failure when it occurs [5]. Fault avoidance is implemented replacing 
the components which mostly compromise the reliability of the system with other more 
reliable ones [5]. The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a reliability analysis methodology that 
allows to identify combination of events that lead to the loss of a specific system 
functionality or to system failure. It is performed implementing the so called fault trees, 
where the components of the system are graphically linked among them through logical 
connections. The FMECA is an inductive process while the FTA is a deductive process. 
They both can be performed from a qualitative or a quantitative point of view [4]. 
The example of FMECA and FTA results reported in this paper have been obtained 
performing a qualitative analysis due to the lack for the moment of RPAS equipment 
reliability data. As indicated in literature [4], reliability data come from targeted  tests run 
coupling the exact operating conditions of the considered item. The purpose of the 
performed analysis was not to evaluate the effective reliability of a given RPAS 
components, but to investigate the adequacy and utility of FMECA methodology for RPAS 
within a more comprehensive risk assessment study applied to unmanned systems. For each 
considered RPAS functional subsystem the qualitative FTA analysis has been perfomed 
investigating the main combinations of events that can lead to its loss. The combinations of 
two, three or four events have been solved applying Boolean Algebra to related truth tables 
or Karnaugh maps (cases of combinations of up to five o six events). Other further more 
complex cases have been left out as less significant for the purpose of the present study. 
The FMECA analysis object of this paper has been performed according to the Military 
Standard 1629 Revision A (MIL-STD-1629A) issued by the Department of Defence of the 
United States of America in 1980 [4]. The FTA analysis object of this paper has been 
performed according to the Military Handbook 338 Revision B issued by the Department of 
Defence of the United States of America in 1998 (MIL-HDBK- 338B) [6]. 
 
Fig. 1. RPAS model, aerial segment. 
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RPAS will probably bring economic benefits in terms of competitiveness in many 
economic activities like agriculture, communication industry, monitoring/inspection of 
infrastructures; transport and logistics, energy delivery. RPAS will preserve human beings 
from fatal injuries or death while performing aerial works. In addition, RPAS diffusion will 
create new jobs and professional figures: the remote pilot/operator, the RPAS manufacturer, 
the analyst of engineering data collected by RPAS during operational sorties [1]. For the 
moment, RPAS only, as a subset of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), remotely piloted by 
a human pilot on ground, will be effectively allowed to be integrated into controlled 
airspaces [2].The key to fully realize these scenarios will be the full and safe integration of 
RPAS into controlled airspaces alongside manned aircraft. Therefore, as it happens for 
manned aircraft, reliability of RPAS subsystems and components shall be considered and 
demonstrated. ‘Failure Modes and Effect and Criticality Analysis’ (FMECA) and ‘Fault 
Tree Analysis’ (FTA) are traditional techniques applied in design and development phases 
of manned aircraft. This article shows an example of application of these methodologies to 
RPAS. Physically, RPAS is a ‘system of systems’ composed of [2] the aerial segment (rotor 
wing or fixed wing RPAS or hybrid RPAS), the ground segment (a portable radiocontroller 
or a ground control station), the Communication, Command and Control (C3) radiolink to 
send commands to the aerial segment and to receive telemetry from the aircraft. Rotor wing 
RPAS are powered by electric motors; fixed wing RPAS are powered by combustion 
engines (with propellers or not); hybrid RPAS are driven by electric engines powered by 
hydrogen fuel cells to enhance their range and endurance. This paper is organized as 
follows: Section 1 is an introduction; Section 2 describes FMECA and FTA methodologies; 
Section 3 shows the RPAS architecture used for the analyses; Section 4 shows analyses 
results; finally, Section 5 sums up the conclusions and open points for future works. 
2 The Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) and the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) methodologies 
The reliability of a given system is the probability that it performs its mission for the 
intended period of time under given operating conditions. An unmanned system will be 
considered reliable if it is fully operative at the start-up, then during pre-flight test, and 
during the whole assigned mission until engines shut down on ground [3]. The Failure 
Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are classical 
methodologies widely described in aeronautical literature and systematicaly used in 
manned aviation to study systems reliability. The FMEA was born in the 1940s in defence 
and nuclear sectors and it was formally adopted by NASA in the 1960s when space 
program activities began [3]. It is a design and decisional tool useful to identify all failure 
modes and effects of a system [4]. Each failure mode is ranked according to its severity [4]. 
that is the worst potential consequence (in terms of human beings injury, or third property 
or system damage) that could ultimately occur [4]. The failure mode is the manner in which 
the failure occurs. A failure cause can be a physical, a chemical process, a quality defect, a 
part misapplication or any other process capable of causing a failure or a stating 
deterioration phenomenon that can provoke a failure. A failure mode effect is a possible 
consequence of a given failure mode that can occur at local, next higher or end effect level 
[4]. An extended version of FMEA analysis has been considered in this paper: the FMECA, 
that is the ‘Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis’ [4]. The ‘Criticality  
Analysis’ is a further part of the analysis to rank each potential failure mode according to 
its combination of severity and probability of occurrence [4]. The criticality analysis is 
completed with the evaluation of the most proper assurances and controls applicable for 
limiting the probability of occurrence of the considered failure mode [4].  
The purpose of FMEA or FMECA analysis, is the identification of single point of 
failures that finally are collected in a report draft according to the FMECA template 
foreseen by [4] at task 103. A single point of failure is the failure of an item able to lead in 
the failure of the system and which is not compensated by any redundancy or operational 
procedure [3]. Single point of failures can be mitigated implementing fault tolerance or 
fault avoidance strategies. Fault tolerance strategies are achieved using hardware 
redundancy schemes arranged in duplicated, triplicated or quadruplicated configurations so 
to tolerate the given failure when it occurs [5]. Fault avoidance is implemented replacing 
the components which mostly compromise the reliability of the system with other more 
reliable ones [5]. The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a reliability analysis methodology that 
allows to identify combination of events that lead to the loss of a specific system 
functionality or to system failure. It is performed implementing the so called fault trees, 
where the components of the system are graphically linked among them through logical 
connections. The FMECA is an inductive process while the FTA is a deductive process. 
They both can be performed from a qualitative or a quantitative point of view [4]. 
The example of FMECA and FTA results reported in this paper have been obtained 
performing a qualitative analysis due to the lack for the moment of RPAS equipment 
reliability data. As indicated in literature [4], reliability data come from targeted  tests run 
coupling the exact operating conditions of the considered item. The purpose of the 
performed analysis was not to evaluate the effective reliability of a given RPAS 
components, but to investigate the adequacy and utility of FMECA methodology for RPAS 
within a more comprehensive risk assessment study applied to unmanned systems. For each 
considered RPAS functional subsystem the qualitative FTA analysis has been perfomed 
investigating the main combinations of events that can lead to its loss. The combinations of 
two, three or four events have been solved applying Boolean Algebra to related truth tables 
or Karnaugh maps (cases of combinations of up to five o six events). Other further more 
complex cases have been left out as less significant for the purpose of the present study. 
The FMECA analysis object of this paper has been performed according to the Military 
Standard 1629 Revision A (MIL-STD-1629A) issued by the Department of Defence of the 
United States of America in 1980 [4]. The FTA analysis object of this paper has been 
performed according to the Military Handbook 338 Revision B issued by the Department of 
Defence of the United States of America in 1998 (MIL-HDBK- 338B) [6]. 
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Fig. 2. RPAS model, C3 radio link. 
 
 
Fig. 3. RPAS model, ground segment. 
3 The RPAS model  
The RPAS model used for the analyses is shown in figure 1, figure 2 and figure 3. 
RPAS subsystems and related functionalities have been allocated according to RPAS 
typical operative mission phases as per the content of figure 4 and Table 1. 
 
Fig. 4. RPAS flight mission phases 
Table 1. RPAS functionalities allocation vs. mission phases 
RPAS Subsystems Mission phases (Rotor wing RPAS) 
Start-up Subsystem 1, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 
Structures X X X X X X X 
Propulsion Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Power Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Flight Navigation Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Information Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Control Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Emergency Flight Subsystem - X X X X X - 
Mission Data Subsystem X X X X X X X 
Payload Data Subsystem - - - X - - - 
Communication Command and Control subsystem X X X X X X X 
Ground Control Station subsystem X X X X X X X 
The FMECA analysis has been performed considering for every RPAS subsystem the 
possible equipment single failure modes. Each failure mode has been coded and 
characterized in terms of effects on the subsystem it belongs to (local, higher and next 
level), mission phase affected (Figure 4 and Table 1), severity of consequences ([4] para. 
4.4.3), probability of occurrence ([4], Task 102, Para. 3.1), detectability level ([4], Task 
101, Para. 5.1), criticality ranking ([4], Task 102, Figure 102.2) and possible compensation 
provisions or mitigation actions ([4], Task 101, Para 5.7).  A FMECA process analysis on 
human figures involved into RPAS operations (the remote pilot, the pilot on board manned 
aircraft and the Air Traffic Controller (ATC)) has been performed to complete the analysis. 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model [7] elaborated by Prof. 
James Reason has been used to identify human operator failure modes in terms of errors 
and violations having an impact on the RPAS system/mission exactly as in case of RPAS 
technical single or combined failures. The FTA analysis has been performed focusing on 
RPAS functionalities associated to each RPAS subsystem listed in Table 1 identifying and 
considering possible combinations of events/faults. The fault trees have been implemented 
according to the criteria and symbology contained in [6]. In this paper Automatic 
Surveillance Dependant – Broadcast (ADS-B) FMECA analysis and Detect and Avoid 
(DAA) functionality (under Flight Control subsystem) FTA analysis have been reported in 
Section 4 as examples of the performed work. Such topics have been preferred for the paper 
among the others included into unmanned systems for their crucial safety role in the 
incoming integration of RPAS into controlled airspace besides manned aircraft ([8], [9]). 
4 FMECA and FTA analyses results 
The results of FMECA analysis of an ‘Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast’ 
(ADS-B) equipment [8] and the results of FTA analysis for an RPAS ‘Detect and Avoid’ 
(DAA) functionality (including ADS-B) are reported hereinafter. The following possible 
ADS-B single points of failure of ADS-B have been identified starting from data available 
in literature for manned aircraft ([8] and [10] for probability of occurrence and detectability 
methods for example) and evaluated as described in Section 2.  
Results: ADS-B loss of position accuracy (Probability of occurrence: E, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); GPS receiver unit fault 
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); ADS-B out antenna deterioration (Probability of occurrence: D, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); broadcast of incorrect data  
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); Broadcast of ADS-B distorted data (Probability of occurrence: D, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); ADS-B emitter transponder 
fault (Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection 
method: ‘None’); erroneous altitude data (Probability of occurrence: C, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None); data encoding error 
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); loss of ADS-B position data to be sent to the emitter (Probability of occurrence: E, 
Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning 
devices’); abrupt interruption of ADS-B service (Probability of occurrence: B, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
abrupt lack of GPS data to ADS-B (Probability of occurrence: E; Failure consequence level 
‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); degradation of data 
accuracy sent by the satellite to the ADS-B (Probability of occurrence: C; Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
loss of satellite integrity signal (Probability of occurrence: E; Failure consequence level 
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The FMECA analysis has been performed considering for every RPAS subsystem the 
possible equipment single failure modes. Each failure mode has been coded and 
characterized in terms of effects on the subsystem it belongs to (local, higher and next 
level), mission phase affected (Figure 4 and Table 1), severity of consequences ([4] para. 
4.4.3), probability of occurrence ([4], Task 102, Para. 3.1), detectability level ([4], Task 
101, Para. 5.1), criticality ranking ([4], Task 102, Figure 102.2) and possible compensation 
provisions or mitigation actions ([4], Task 101, Para 5.7).  A FMECA process analysis on 
human figures involved into RPAS operations (the remote pilot, the pilot on board manned 
aircraft and the Air Traffic Controller (ATC)) has been performed to complete the analysis. 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model [7] elaborated by Prof. 
James Reason has been used to identify human operator failure modes in terms of errors 
and violations having an impact on the RPAS system/mission exactly as in case of RPAS 
technical single or combined failures. The FTA analysis has been performed focusing on 
RPAS functionalities associated to each RPAS subsystem listed in Table 1 identifying and 
considering possible combinations of events/faults. The fault trees have been implemented 
according to the criteria and symbology contained in [6]. In this paper Automatic 
Surveillance Dependant – Broadcast (ADS-B) FMECA analysis and Detect and Avoid 
(DAA) functionality (under Flight Control subsystem) FTA analysis have been reported in 
Section 4 as examples of the performed work. Such topics have been preferred for the paper 
among the others included into unmanned systems for their crucial safety role in the 
incoming integration of RPAS into controlled airspace besides manned aircraft ([8], [9]). 
4 FMECA and FTA analyses results 
The results of FMECA analysis of an ‘Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast’ 
(ADS-B) equipment [8] and the results of FTA analysis for an RPAS ‘Detect and Avoid’ 
(DAA) functionality (including ADS-B) are reported hereinafter. The following possible 
ADS-B single points of failure of ADS-B have been identified starting from data available 
in literature for manned aircraft ([8] and [10] for probability of occurrence and detectability 
methods for example) and evaluated as described in Section 2.  
Results: ADS-B loss of position accuracy (Probability of occurrence: E, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); GPS receiver unit fault 
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); ADS-B out antenna deterioration (Probability of occurrence: D, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); broadcast of incorrect data  
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); Broadcast of ADS-B distorted data (Probability of occurrence: D, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None’); ADS-B emitter transponder 
fault (Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection 
method: ‘None’); erroneous altitude data (Probability of occurrence: C, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘None); data encoding error 
(Probability of occurrence: E, Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’); loss of ADS-B position data to be sent to the emitter (Probability of occurrence: E, 
Failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning 
devices’); abrupt interruption of ADS-B service (Probability of occurrence: B, Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
abrupt lack of GPS data to ADS-B (Probability of occurrence: E; Failure consequence level 
‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); degradation of data 
accuracy sent by the satellite to the ADS-B (Probability of occurrence: C; Failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
loss of satellite integrity signal (Probability of occurrence: E; Failure consequence level 
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‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’);  sudden delayed 
aircraft position updates without any notification (Probability of occurrence: C, failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC controllers (Probability of occurrence: D, failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
degradation loss of ADS-B data-link (Probability of occurrence: C, failure consequence 
level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); ADS-B 
ground station failure (Probability of occurrence: D, failure consequence level 
‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); human error 
(Probability of occurrence: D, failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’). Table 2 shows the final ADS-B resulting criticality matrix. The severity of 
occurrence has been classified by the Authors as ‘Catastrophic (Level I) for every given 
failure mode. The reason is that ADS-B loss or degradation of performance can affect the 
safety of the RPAS reasonably enhancing the probability of occurrence of mid-air collisions 
between manned aircraft and RPAS or between RPAS if flying on the same route. 
According to [8], most failure modes are undetectable from the remote pilot; in the best 
cases visual or audible warning devices can be foreseen for his situational awareness. In 
general, preventive measures can be adopted in terms of design solutions or systematic 
operator actions like regular maintenance and testing of ADS-B avionic equipment. For 
example, redundancy with EGNOS (more reliable than GPS thanks to Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) or Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) 
functions) can be indicated in case of loss or degradation of GPS ; or  redundancy with 
inertial navigation systems are indicated in case of abrupt interruption of ADS-B service or 
abrupt lack of sending position to ADS-B [8]. Avionics maintenance actions can be 
suggested in case of ADS-B out antenna deterioration, altimeter failure, encoder errors or 
delayed or wrong aircraft position for ATC operators. Preventive cyber countermeasures 
are recommended against intentional or unintentional radio frequency interference 
occurrence or more specifically against malicious jamming against ADS-B signals Looking 
forward to incoming diffusion of RPAS into the controlled airspace, proper design 
requirements sized on the given RPAS category against electromagnetic interference both 
from external and internal RF sources can be recommended. 
The ADS-B failure affects the ‘Detect and Avoid’ functionality [11] due to the loss of 
RPAS/aircraft position information. This fact leads to the consequent lack of input to the 
autopilot to command proper evasive manoeuvres to avoid potential collisions. The 
degradation of DAA functionality has been formally expressed implementing a simple 
model of DAA fault tree and solving the related truth table with three variables. More 
precisely, the combinations of GPS, altimeter or ADS_B failures suggest the potential 
occurrence of hazards like ‘Loss of separation’ and ‘Mid-air collisions’. 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper shows an example of application of RPAS of reliability analysis tecniques to 
RPAS. The obtained results confirm the value of FMECA and FTA as decisional tools for 
RPAS too as systematic methodologies to find out single or combined failures that are 
potential sources of technical hazard for RPAS. Reasoning about ADS-B and DAA failures, 
it is easy to imagine the hidden hazards. Wrong RPAS position indication provided by 
ADS-B to other traffic implies misleading separations and distances from other aircraft and 
human operators loss of situational awareness: the hidden hazard results to be mid-air 
collision. DAA malfunction due to ADS-B failure standalone or combined with GPS or 
altimeter failures can lead to the lack of performance of correct evasive manoeuvres.  
Again, the risk of a mid-air collision can occur as worst consequences with the highest 
severe consequence: loss of RPAS, loss of RPAS mission and loss of economic gain related 
to the the RPAS mission. A high value can be recognized to FMECA and FTA while RPAS 
are now object of great interest and attention from international aviation community. With 
reference to the present study, an extended FMECA/FTA evaluation has been performed on 
a complete RPAS architecture to find out more technical failures. Then these data have 
been evaluated in terms of risk assessment to implement a more comprehensive risk matrix 
including hazards coming from the operational environment where RPAS will fly and 
hazards caused by weather conditions. As discussed in Section 4, useful design indications 
can derive from reasoning about reliability analyses results like when and how implement 
equipment redundancy or when focusing on proper maintenance actions. From this point of 
view, another possible extension of the present study is carrying out systematic analyses to 
identify the most critical issues to focus on when defining requirements for future RPAS 
airworthiness certification. 
 
Table 2. ADS-B criticality matrix 
LEVEL A 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   Abrupt interruption of ADS-B service (NISSA10) 
LEVEL C 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Erroneous altitude Data (NISSA7) 
Degradation of data accuracy sent by 
the satellite to the ADS-B (NISSA12) 
Sudden delayed aircraft position 
updates without any notification 
(NISSA14) 
Degradation/loss of ADS-B  signal 
(NISSA16) 
Human error (nissa18) 
 
LEVEL D 
REMOTE 
   
ADS-B OUT antenna 
deterioration(NISSA3) 
Broadcast of distorted data (NISSA5) 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC  
controllers without notification 
(NISSA15) 
ADS-B ground station failure 
(NISSA17) 
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ADS-B  
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Data encoding error (NISSA8) 
Loss of position data to be sent to the 
emitter (NISSA9) 
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Loss of satellite signal integrity 
(NISSA13) 
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‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’);  sudden delayed 
aircraft position updates without any notification (Probability of occurrence: C, failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC controllers (Probability of occurrence: D, failure 
consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); 
degradation loss of ADS-B data-link (Probability of occurrence: C, failure consequence 
level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); ADS-B 
ground station failure (Probability of occurrence: D, failure consequence level 
‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: ‘Visual or audible warning devices’); human error 
(Probability of occurrence: D, failure consequence level ‘Catastrophic’, Detection method: 
‘None’). Table 2 shows the final ADS-B resulting criticality matrix. The severity of 
occurrence has been classified by the Authors as ‘Catastrophic (Level I) for every given 
failure mode. The reason is that ADS-B loss or degradation of performance can affect the 
safety of the RPAS reasonably enhancing the probability of occurrence of mid-air collisions 
between manned aircraft and RPAS or between RPAS if flying on the same route. 
According to [8], most failure modes are undetectable from the remote pilot; in the best 
cases visual or audible warning devices can be foreseen for his situational awareness. In 
general, preventive measures can be adopted in terms of design solutions or systematic 
operator actions like regular maintenance and testing of ADS-B avionic equipment. For 
example, redundancy with EGNOS (more reliable than GPS thanks to Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) or Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) 
functions) can be indicated in case of loss or degradation of GPS ; or  redundancy with 
inertial navigation systems are indicated in case of abrupt interruption of ADS-B service or 
abrupt lack of sending position to ADS-B [8]. Avionics maintenance actions can be 
suggested in case of ADS-B out antenna deterioration, altimeter failure, encoder errors or 
delayed or wrong aircraft position for ATC operators. Preventive cyber countermeasures 
are recommended against intentional or unintentional radio frequency interference 
occurrence or more specifically against malicious jamming against ADS-B signals Looking 
forward to incoming diffusion of RPAS into the controlled airspace, proper design 
requirements sized on the given RPAS category against electromagnetic interference both 
from external and internal RF sources can be recommended. 
The ADS-B failure affects the ‘Detect and Avoid’ functionality [11] due to the loss of 
RPAS/aircraft position information. This fact leads to the consequent lack of input to the 
autopilot to command proper evasive manoeuvres to avoid potential collisions. The 
degradation of DAA functionality has been formally expressed implementing a simple 
model of DAA fault tree and solving the related truth table with three variables. More 
precisely, the combinations of GPS, altimeter or ADS_B failures suggest the potential 
occurrence of hazards like ‘Loss of separation’ and ‘Mid-air collisions’. 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper shows an example of application of RPAS of reliability analysis tecniques to 
RPAS. The obtained results confirm the value of FMECA and FTA as decisional tools for 
RPAS too as systematic methodologies to find out single or combined failures that are 
potential sources of technical hazard for RPAS. Reasoning about ADS-B and DAA failures, 
it is easy to imagine the hidden hazards. Wrong RPAS position indication provided by 
ADS-B to other traffic implies misleading separations and distances from other aircraft and 
human operators loss of situational awareness: the hidden hazard results to be mid-air 
collision. DAA malfunction due to ADS-B failure standalone or combined with GPS or 
altimeter failures can lead to the lack of performance of correct evasive manoeuvres.  
Again, the risk of a mid-air collision can occur as worst consequences with the highest 
severe consequence: loss of RPAS, loss of RPAS mission and loss of economic gain related 
to the the RPAS mission. A high value can be recognized to FMECA and FTA while RPAS 
are now object of great interest and attention from international aviation community. With 
reference to the present study, an extended FMECA/FTA evaluation has been performed on 
a complete RPAS architecture to find out more technical failures. Then these data have 
been evaluated in terms of risk assessment to implement a more comprehensive risk matrix 
including hazards coming from the operational environment where RPAS will fly and 
hazards caused by weather conditions. As discussed in Section 4, useful design indications 
can derive from reasoning about reliability analyses results like when and how implement 
equipment redundancy or when focusing on proper maintenance actions. From this point of 
view, another possible extension of the present study is carrying out systematic analyses to 
identify the most critical issues to focus on when defining requirements for future RPAS 
airworthiness certification. 
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